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ABSTRACT
The applicability of biological market theory with its emphasis on partner choice is ex-
plored using the interactions between the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus and its
“client” reef fish as a model system of mutualism. Cleaners have small territories, which
the majority of reef fish species actively visit to invite inspection of their surface, gills,
and mouth. Clients benefit from the removal of parasites while cleaners benefit from the
access to a food source. Some client species (choosy clients) have large home ranges that
cover several cleaning stations, whereas other clients have small ranges and have access
to one cleaning station only (resident clients). Field observations, field manipulations,
and laboratory experiments revealed that whether or not a client has choice options influ-
ences several aspects of both cleaner and client behavior. Cleaners give choosy clients
priority of access. Choosy clients switch partners if cheated by a cleaner (= cleaner feeds
on mucus/scales), whereas resident clients punish cheats. Cleaners and resident clients,
but not choosy clients, build up relationships before normal cleaning interactions take
place. Cleaners are particularly cooperative if choosy clients are bystanders of an interac-
tion but less so when resident clients are bystanders. When it comes to the frequency of
cheating by cleaner fish, however, partner choice options are overrun by client control
mechanisms: predatory clients are far less often cheated than nonpredatory clients, irre-
spective of choice options. Future research needs to focus more on empirical testing of
game theory so that this new information can be used to formulate deductive models.
INTRODUCTION
On human markets, goods or services are traded against money or other goods. It
is well established that changes in the ratio between the supply of a good/service
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and the demand cause changes in its price. This is because when the supply is
higher than the demand, potential buyers are able to compare prices and choose
the cheapest offer. This choosiness of buyers is crucial, as it exerts pressure on
sellers to outcompete each other with lower prices in order sell their goods.
These principles have recently been applied to cooperative (within species) and
mutualistic (between species) interactions in animals (Noë et al. 1991; Noë and
Hammerstein 1994, 1995; Noë 2001). The biological market approach has two
major goals:
1. Explain adaptations that are the result of “market selection.” Market se-
lection explains the evolution of mechanisms enabling partner choice as
well as adaptations that increase the chances of being chosen in coopera-
tive and mutualistic systems. There is an obvious overlap with the evolu-
tion of mate preference and the selection for secondary sexual characters
driven by mate choice, but we propose to use the label “market selection”
only in relation to cooperation outside the mating context. A crucial dif-
ference is that covariance between choice mechanisms and chosen traits
typical for sexual selection (Fisher 1930) is unlikely to occur under mar-
ket selection, notably when trading partners belong to different species.
2. Predict changes in exchange rates of commodities due to changes in the
supply/demand ratio between these commodities.
Mechanisms, such as partner choice and outbidding competitors, are relevant in
three major fields within behavioral ecology: sexual selection, intraspecific co-
operation, and interspecific mutualism (see below). To date, surprisingly little
attention has been paid to the selective force of partner choice outside the con-
text of sexual selection. Similarly exchange ratios have been studied in the con-
text of mating markets but not in the context of cooperation and mutualism. This
is probably due to an obsession with partner control in the theoretical ap-
proaches to cooperation, as a result of a historically determined fascination with
the evolution of altruism. Classical models of cooperation are usually based on
an iterated version of the so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981). In short, a PD exists if two players, who can either cooperate or
defect, receive a higher payoff from defection independently of the partner’s be-
havior; if both cooperate, however, they receive a higher payoff than if both de-
fect. Because of the payoff structure, cooperation is highly unlikely in
single-round PD games, but in iterated versions several strategies have been
proposed that lead to evolutionarily stable cooperation (reviewed by Dugatkin
1997). In other words, once all individuals of a given population play certain co-
operative strategies, the population cannot be invaded by individuals playing
any defecting strategy. The cooperative strategists, on average, gain higher pay-
offs than the individuals playing a defective strategy.
At first glance, it appears that partner control models and biological market
models address different problems invoked in cooperative interactions.
“Traders” on biological markets may react to partners that do not yield enough
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“profit” by terminating the cooperative relationship. The negative effects of this
decision to the actor can be limited if he can switch to an alternative partner. The
biological market paradigm explicitly excludes the use of force to extort com-
modities from partners in the same sense that mainstream economical models
also ignore the possibility of theft and robbery. In partner control models, which
usually focus on the interactions of two players only, all forms of defections and
reactions to defections are considered, from simply terminating the cooperation
to the use of force and other forms of coercion. Partner control models thus cover
the whole spectrum of cooperative to exploitative interactions. In reality, there
are obvious connections between partner choice and partner control issues. Ulti-
mately, the two approaches have to be brought together. To keep things simple at
first, however, it may be desirable to study partner choice and partner control
separately.
In this chapter we use data on cleaner fish – client reef fish interactions to ex-
plore how market theory may explain (a) payoff asymmetries between cooperat-
ing partners, (b) differences in strategic options that are available to partners, (c)
how partner choice interacts with partner control mechanisms, and (d) how in-
complete control over the resources traded may lead to a shift from mutualism to
parasitism.
BIOLOGICALMARKETS IN NATURE: ASHORT
OVERVIEWOFTHE EVIDENCE
Noë and Hammerstein (1994, 1995) concentrated on cooperative and
mutualistic systems in which two classes of traders can be distinguished that
control different commodities. In such systems, “bartering” can take place
through the mechanism of partner switching. Consistent partner choice over
many generations can lead to the selection of specific adaptations comparable to
secondary sexual characters, which evolve under selection through mate choice.
Noë and Hammerstein (1994) used the example of delayed plumage maturation
in purple martins based on data presented by Morton et al. (1990). Male purple
martins may control several nest cavities, most of which are “martin houses”
provided by humans in this day and age. The male can only use one cavity for
breeding, since the species has obligatory biparental care. However, he can al-
low a pair consisting of a yearling male and his mate to breed in another cavity
under his control. By copulating with the female of the subordinate pair, the
dominant male gains some extra offspring that are cared for by another male.
The subordinate males also gain, since they usually sire some chicks produced
by their mate. Without access to this nesting opportunity, they would not have
any offspring at all. Noë and Hammerstein (1994) proposed that the delayed
plumage maturation in the purple martins is selected for through the choice
made by the dominant males among the yearlings. By accepting only males that
carry obvious signs of subordinance as subletters they would lower the risk of
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challenges to their own position. Females probably prefer males with a mature
plumage and males with delayed plumage would not be able to hold a nest cavity
for very long, since they would attract immediate attacks from other adult males.
The weak point in this account is that the situation is rather unnatural: the
evolution of delayed plumage maturation over the period that humans provide
grouped nest cavities in the form of martin houses is unlikely. However, Greene
et al. (2000) recently provided a very similar example in another colorful North
American bird, the lazuli bunting, observed in a natural setting. In this species,
dominant males do not accept yearling males with delayed plumage maturation
in adjacent cavities but in adjacent territories. Greene et al. carefully checked
that the conditions for market selection were met.
Under market selection, the evolution of mechanisms for implementing
choice can be expected in the choosing class. Bull and Rice (1991) hypothesized
such a mechanism for the fig/fig-wasp system: the selective abortion of
overexploited figs. Although this is probably not the mechanism that figs use to
control overexploitation (Herre and West 1997), the abortion mechanism has
been described for similar pollination mutualisms (e.g., Pellmyr and Huth 1994;
Fleming and Holland 1998). Both sides in a market may evolve mechanisms that
ensure that the partner (a) cannot rob a commodity and (b) has to pay a price as
high as the law of supply and demand allows. Flowers may, for example, have
structures that force pollinators to stay longer and take up more pollen, instead of
offering more nectar.
Biological markets can be found throughout the living world. As long as
there is a possibility to exchange commodities and at least one of the trading
partners can exert choice, the market mechanism may influence the outcome of
the interaction. One should not forget, however, that commodities from abiotic
sources may play a role as well. Such resources can sometimes be in competition
with commodities provided by one of the trader classes. This is, for example, the
case in the biological markets involving mycorrhiza (Schwartz and Hoeksema
1998; Wilkinson 2001) and rhizobia (Simms and Taylor 2002), i.e., mutualisms
in which plants exchange nutrients with fungi and bacteria, respectively. These
markets can be strongly influenced by abiotic sources of these nutrients, includ-
ing artificial fertilizers (West et al. 2002).
Exact quantitative predictions of exchange rates on the basis of supply/de-
mand ratios are hard to make, both for human economic systems and for biologi-
cal systems. It is easy, however, to predict in which direction the exchange rate
will change when the supply/demand ratio shifts. The most straightforward and
simple example published to date is probably by Henzi and Barrett (2002): Ba-
boon females like to inspect and handle the infants of other females, but they are
not allowed to do so without “paying” for it by grooming the mother first. Henzi
and Barrett predicted that females would have to groom longer when there were
fewer infants available in the group, a prediction that held both when mothers
were dominant over the would-be handlers of their infant and when the mothers
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were subordinate. There was a quantitative difference between the two cases:
the use of force can alter or even overrule market effects (see below).
Together with further examples of biological markets given in Noë et al.
(1991), Noë and Hammerstein (1994, 1995), and Noë (2001), these examples
show that market theory provides a general framework to study payoff distribu-
tions among partners in sexual selection, cooperation, and mutualism. We will
now explore the applicability of market theory and its current limits by provid-
ing a detailed overview on a field and experimental study on the mutualism be-
tween the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus and other reef fish species.
ACASE STUDY:MUTUALISM BETWEEN THE CLEANER
WRASSE L. DIMIDIATUS ANDCLIENTREEFFISH
In coral reefs from the Red Sea through the Indo-pacific to the Great Barrier
Reef in Northeastern Australia, the best way to see a wide variety of fish species
within a short time period is to locate a cleaner wrasse,L. dimidiatus. These fish
are visited by the majority of other reef fish species who often “pose” for the
cleaner by spreading their pectoral fins and stopping coordinated swimming,
leading to “head up” or “head down” postures, depending on the species. Posing
is a signal to the cleaner fish that the visitor seeks its service, which comprises
the removal of ectoparasites and dead or infected tissue from the body surface,
the gills, and sometimes even inside the mouth. The deal seems to be straightfor-
ward: the cleaner fish gets access to an easy meal and the so-called “client” gets
cleaned.L. dimidiatus is just one of a large variety of cleaning organisms but it is
probably the best studied (for reviews, see Losey et al. 1999; Côté 2000). The in-
teraction between L. dimidiatus and its clients has attracted considerable atten-
tion, one reason being that it is particularly suited to test game theoretical models
of cooperation among unrelated organisms. Individual L. dimidiatus may have
more than 2000 interactions per day, eat about 1200 parasites per day, and may
reduce the parasite density on clients by a factor of 4–5 (Grutter 1999). Most re-
cently, it was found that clients without access to cleaner fish in their natural en-
vironment showed a higher stress response to capture than clients with access to
cleaner fish (R. Bshary, R. Oliveira, and A. Canario, unpubl. data). The differ-
ence can be seen as a net difference between costs and benefits of cleaning inter-
actions. There is thus little doubt that interactions between cleaner fish and
clients are overall mutualistic, i.e., to the benefit of both partners.
There are several forms of conflict in these interactions. One of the most well
known involves the possibility of predatory clients defecting by eating the
cleaner rather than letting it inspect — a problem that Trivers (1971) used to ex-
plain his concept of reciprocal altruism. He proposed that predators refrain from
eating cleaners despite the energy gain being higher than the gain from the re-
moval of parasites in one single interaction. Refraining from eating cleaners
only becomes advantageous for the predator when the repeated removal of
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parasites by a particular cleaner leads to a larger benefit than eating that cleaner.
Trivers’s idea has not yet been tested but there is some evidence that predators
may eat cleaners under some circumstances (Côté 2000). In this chapter, we do
not limit ourselves to the game between cleaners and predatory clients but rather
focus on the strategies cleaner fish use when confronted with different types of
clients and how these clients deal with them. It is important to note that the ma-
jority of client species feed on plankton or graze and are hence not potential
predators of cleaners.
Recent experimental evidence suggests that cleaners regularly cheat clients
by consuming client mucus and scales, as the consumption of these food items is
not linked to the removal of ectoparasites (Bshary and Grutter 2002a). In addi-
tion, there might be conflicts between cleaners and clients over the timing and
duration of interactions. This conflict is most obvious when two or more clients
seek inspection from the same cleaner simultaneously so that the cleaner has to
choose between them. As we shall see, the solutions to these conflicts are often,
but not always, dependent on the ratio between supply and demand.
Methods
We refer to a single species of cleaner wrasse: L. dimidiatus. All reported field
observations and field experiments were conducted at Ras Mohammed National
Park, Egypt. Data were either collected while sitting 2–3 m in front of a cleaning
station or by following individual clients. Interactions between cleaners and cli-
ents were first observed and then the key information was noted on a Plexiglas
plate. Laboratory experiments were conducted at the Lizard Island Research
Station, Great Barrier Reef, Australia. For methodological details, we refer to
the respective publications of the original data.
Game Structure
For a thorough appreciation of what happens during interactions, it is important
to outline the strategic options of cleaners and clients. Note that the game struc-
ture applies to L. dimidiatusbut may be different for other cleaner fish species.
1. Repeated game structure: Individual clients seek inspection about 5–30
times per day, in extreme cases more than 100 times a day (Grutter 1995).
Even clients with territories or home ranges that cover large reef areas may
interact repeatedly with the same individual cleaner fish. Cleaners may
have more than 2000 cleaning interactions per day (Grutter 1995). Cleaners
are territorial and usually move within very confined areas of a few cubic
meters, which led to the term “cleaning station.” Clients can tell individual
cleaners apart through site recognition (unless there is a pair of cleaners at
one station) and/or individual recognition. Experimental evidence indi-
cates that cleaners can recognize individual clients (Tebbich et al. 2002), al-
though it is hard to quantify how many they actually recognize under
natural conditions.
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2. Choice options: Due to the cleaners’ site fidelity, a client decides whether
or not to visit a cleaner and to seek an interaction; cleaners only have the
option of ignoring a visiting client. Members of some client species (also
called “residents”) have small territories or home ranges, which allow
them access to only one cleaning station. Cleaners, thus, have veto power
(Noë 1990) in that they have exclusive access to these clients without
competition from other cleaners. Cleaners are, therefore, expected to be
in a strong position with respect to the service quality: they can cheat resi-
dents more often and let them wait longer than nonresident clients. Indi-
viduals of nonresident client species have home ranges that cover several
cleaning stations (further called “choosy clients”). In these cases, clean-
ers compete among each other to attract these clients. As each cleaner re-
mains at its respective cleaning station, competition can only take place
through outbidding each other with better service quality, not through ag-
gressive interference or actively approaching clients. Clients with the op-
tion to choose between cleaners are therefore expected to show
preference for the cleaners that offer the best service.
3. Asymmetry in possible sanctions: About 15% of client species are preda-
tory in the sense that they hunt fish that are the size of cleaners. In interac-
tions between cleaners and predatory clients, both have symmetrical
strategic options, i.e., each party can either cooperate or cheat. However,
the effects of cheating on the partner are highly asymmetric: an exploited
predator only loses a little bit of mucus, whereas an exploited cleaner
loses its life. In interactions between cleaners and the 85% nonpredatory
client species (grazers or plankton feeders), the strategic options are
asymmetric: the cleaner can cooperate as well as cheat whereas the client
has no option to exploit the cleaner to its own advantage. These clients
can only control the duration of an interaction, i.e., by swimming off,
they can terminate an interaction.
APUREMARKETGAMEDETERMINED BYSUPPLYAND
DEMAND: CLIENT–CLIENTCOMPETITIONOVER
PRIORITYOFACCESS TO CLEANER FISH
Sometimes a client arrives at a cleaning station while the cleaner is inspecting
another client; sometimes two or more clients seek the inspection of a cleaner
fish simultaneously. In such cases, individual clients compete directly over ac-
cess to the cleaner fish. This competition takes place only through inviting the
cleaner for inspection, not through aggressive displacement (Bshary 2001).
Market theory makes the following predictions for these situations:
1. Cleaners should give priority to choosy clients over resident clients. The
reason is that choosy clients can visit another cleaning station rather than
queuing for service. A cleaner that ignores a choosy client in favor of a
resident client could lose access to a food source, and selection is
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expected to work against that decision rule. Resident clients have no
strategy available to push a cleaner into giving them priority of access.
They have to come back at a time that is more convenient for the cleaner
if they want to be inspected at all. Acleaner’s access to this food source is
thus just delayed if it ignores the resident’s invitation for inspection in fa-
vor of another client.
2. The preference for choosy clients should be independent of the clients’
quality as a food patch. Optimal foraging theory based on the marginal
value theorem (Charnov 1976) would lead to an alternative prediction: as
client size strongly correlates with parasite load (Grutter 1995), the deci-
sions of the cleaner fish should be determined by the relative body sizes
of clients that present themselves simultaneously.
Field observations were in line with predictions based on market theory.
Cleaners switched from resident clients to choosy clients 51 times but only once
the other way round; when a choosy client and a resident client invited inspec-
tion simultaneously, the cleaners inspected the choosy client in 65 out of 66 ob-
servations (Bshary 2001). These results were independent of the clients’ relative
body sizes, as the choosy clients were smaller than the residents in 12 (switch-
ing) and in 21 (queuing) occasions. Following individual long-nosed parrotfish,
Hipposcarus harid, for up to 120 minutes, Bshary and Schäffer (2002) con-
firmed that choosy clients are indeed active players in the game. The probability
of a client returning to the same cleaning station for its next inspection was high
(median of 13 individuals: 60%) if it was inspected, but low (median: 0%,
n = 13) if it had been ignored in favor of another (choosy) client.
It could have been that choosy clients are better food patches than residents,
independent of size, because they might visit cleaning stations less frequently
than residents to optimize foraging, or that choosy clients are generally more in-
fected than residents because they traverse larger areas, which might make them
more vulnerable to infestation. Therefore, Bshary and Grutter (2002b) experi-
mentally removed food patch quality as a confounding variable. Cleaner fish
were kept in aquaria that had a compartment inaccessible to the cleaner. A lever
construction allowed two Plexiglas plates of similar shape and color, but of dif-
ferent sizes, to be moved in and out of the cleaners’ compartment. On both
plates, equal amounts of mashed shrimp meat were spread over an area of 4 cm2.
Cleaners could thus choose between two food patches of equal quality and,
when the two plates were presented simultaneously, had to decide which one to
inspect first. The lever construction was used to mimic differences in behaviors
between resident clients and choosy clients. Two differences could potentially
provide cleaners with clues about clients being either residents or choosy under
natural conditions. First, residents are often willing to queue for inspection
when the cleaner is busy with another client, but choosy clients swim off in such
situations. Second, residents may revisit the cleaner shortly after being ignored,
whereas choosy clients switch to another cleaning station. We mimicked these
two cues in two experiments.
8
Experiment 1: The “resident plate” was left in the cleaners’ compartment
until the cleaner finished foraging, whereas the “choosy plate” was re-
trieved immediately if the cleaner started eating from the other plate.
Experiment 2: The plate that was first ignored was invariably pulled back,
but the resident plate was pushed in again as soon as the cleaner had fin-
ished foraging on the choosy plate; the choosy plate was not returned.
Cleaners were repeatedly confronted with these situations, and market theory
predicted that the cleaners should develop a preference for the choosy plate de-
spite a lack of difference between the two plates regarding patch quality. In both
experiments, a significant proportion of cleaners soon fed from the “choosy”
plate first (median values for trials 16–20 in Experiment 1 and trials 11–15 in
Experiment 2: 80%). In combination with the field observations, these results
provide strong support for the market theory. The partner choice options (and
the use of them) of choosy clients select for cleaner fish that give them priority of
access over residents.
ALimitation of Market Theory: Predicting Cheating
Frequencies by Cleaner Fish
From a client’s perspective, a good cleaning service does not only include get-
ting priority of access but also that the cleaner searches for parasites and refrains
from eating healthy client tissue. From a cleaner’s perspective, however, search-
ing for parasites is time consuming whereas client mucus is readily available.
Therefore, a conflict between cleaner and client exists over the cleaner’s forag-
ing behavior. Most client species do not win this conflict entirely (cf. below) and
fortunately, defections by the cleaner become visible to the observer through
short jolts performed by clients in response to cleaner fish mouth contact. There
is experimental evidence that client jolts are not related to the removal of para-
sites; to the contrary, clients jolt more frequently the less parasite infested they
are (Bshary and Grutter 2002a). Jolt rates are therefore a good correlate of
cleaner fish cheating rates. (This does not exclude the possibility that a jolt may
sometimes occur in response to the removal of a parasite.) In an experiment in
which anaesthetized parasite-free client surgeon fish Ctenochaetus striatus
were added to a cleaner fish in an aquarium, most cleaners scraped the surface of
their clients rather than feeding on prawns that were provided as an alternative
food source (Bshary and Grutter 2002a). It thus appears that when clients cannot
control cleaner fish behavior, cleaners are likely to cheat. So how do clients con-
trol cheating frequencies of cleaners, and what factors may explain variation
among different client species with regard to cleaner fish defection frequencies?
Market theory predicts that choosy clients use their option to play cleaners off
against each other to control cheating partners. It is therefore predicted that
choosy clients swim off when the cleaner bites them and visit a different cleaner
for their next inspection (similar to situations where cleaners ignore them as dis-
cussed above). Resident clients, however, lack this option of switching partners.
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Market theory therefore predicts that residents have to accept more frequent
cheating by the cleaner than choosy clients.
Field observations revealed that choosy clients do indeed use their choice op-
tion to control defecting cleaners. Long-nosed parrotfish came back to the very
same cleaning station for their next inspection if the previous one had ended
without a conflict due to cheating by the cleaner in 65% of observations; they,
however, switched to another cleaning station if the cleaner had bitten them in
about 90% of observations (Bshary and Schäffer 2002). Partner choice is not the
only option for clients to keep the cleaner in check. As suggested by Trivers
(1971), predatory clients can eat the cleaner. All clients have the option to attack
the cleaner and chase it around, a strategy which may represent “punishment”
sensu Clutton-Brock and Parker (1995). A strategy based on punishment in-
cludes three steps:
1. An individual A performs an act that increases its own fitness at the ex-
pense of the fitness of another individual B.
2. In response, individual B performs an act that is temporarily spiteful as it
reduces the fitness of both individuals.
3. As a consequence, individual A will change its behavior in a way that is
costly for itself but increases the fitness of individual B.
Note this strategy does not imply any causal understanding by the players. This
form of punishment is exactly what happens during interactions between clean-
ers and resident clients. Cheating by cleaners was often followed by the clients
chasing the cleaners (> 60% of responses). As a result of chasing, the interaction
terminated in 95% of observations (n = 195). During the next interaction be-
tween the cleaner and the same individual, which is usually delayed by a few
minutes, the cleaner refrained from cheating (median value of jolt frequencies in
36 client species is 0/100 s in interactions following chasing, compared to
~5/100 s on average). In summary, there are three ways in which different client
species may control cleaner fish defection: kill and eat (predators), partner
switching (choosy clients), and punishment (resident clients).
Predatory client species jolted less frequently than nonpredatory client spe-
cies (Bshary 2001). Within the predator category, there was no significant differ-
ence between resident predators and choosy predators. Basically, predatory
clients did not jolt (median values for both resident and choosy predatory spe-
cies = 0/100 s interactions). Nonpredatory choosy clients, on average, jolted
less frequently than nonpredatory resident clients. However, this result appeared
to be confounded by size, in particular in resident species. There was a signifi-
cant negative correlation between resident client size and jolt rates (rs = –0.51,
n = 24 species, p < 0.01). This correlation is not caused by larger resident clients
being more likely to punish cleaners as there was no correlation between resi-
dent client size and probability of punishment (both small and large species pun-
ish > 60% of cleaner cheats). When only resident and choosy client species of
similar size were considered, no significant difference in jolt rates between the
two client categories were found (p > 0.1) (Bshary 2001). It thus appears that the
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predators’ option to kill the cleaner leads the cleaners to engage in an uncondi-
tional cooperative strategy during interactions with predators. In conclusion, be-
ing or not being able to choose among cleaners does not predict cleaner fish
cheating rates. This is because the choice option of choosy clients is just one of
several potential mechanisms, of which being able to retaliate cheating seems to
be the most efficient.Predatory clients are cheated least frequently probably be-
cause they could eat cleaners; the punishment of cheating cleaners by resident
clients is about as effective as the switching strategy of choosy clients. Never-
theless, the market situation still determines who has to invest in partner coer-
cion in the form of “punishment” and who has not.
INTEGRATINGMARKETTHEORY INTO PARTNER
CONTROLTHEORY
Partner control theory in the context of cooperation is heavily biased toward the
iterated PD game (IPD) (review in Dugatkin 1997). Since Axelrod and Hamil-
ton (1981) used computer tournaments in the IPD and found that “Tit-for-Tat”
(start cooperative and consequently play the strategy your partner played in the
previous round) emerged as the superior strategy, many extensions have been
explored (Dugatkin 1997). Recently, Roberts and Sherratt (1998) explored vari-
able payoffs, and Nowak and Sigmund (1998) explored the evolution of altruis-
tic behavior based on indirect reciprocity (help to receive future help from the
observers rather than the recipient). However, most examples of intraspecific
cooperation and interspecific mutualism do not seem to fit the models. Bshary
and Grutter (2002a) argued that this is becausethe participants in most empirical
examples have different strategic options and thus should be analyzed with the
help of asymmetrical games. One class of traders usually lacks the option to gain
anything from exploiting the partner, whereas the other class has the option to
gain from cheating. A typical example is the cleaner fish – client mutualism ex-
plained above but there are plenty of others (Bshary and Grutter 2002a). For a
further introduction into these systems, see Noë et al. (1991) and Noë (2001).
Because of the asymmetric structure of many cooperative and most
mutualistic games, the IPD is not the appropriate framework to analyze which
conditions lead to cooperative outcomes. In contrast, partner choice options will
be of major importance in understanding the structure of the underlying game
and the payoff configuration. As we argued above, partner choice can be a mech-
anism of partner control in asymmetric games. However, partner choice options
(or the lack of them) may influence partner control games in other ways as well,
as we illustrate below with further data on the cleaner fish – client mutualism.
Interaction between Partner Choice and the Need for
Building up Relationships
Consider a model of reciprocal altruism where the investment of both partners
can be variable. Roberts and Sherratt (1998) proposed that a strategy called
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“raising the stakes” might prove to be an evolutionary stable solution to this
game. Raising the stakes means that an individual will initially invest very little
into its partner and will stepwise increase investment if the partner returns at
least the same amount. If the investment is not met, the individual stops being al-
truistic. Thus, relationships are built up carefully and therefore no defecting
strategy can yield large benefits, as only established relationships consist of
partners trading large favors. Testing the predictions of the model within the
asymmetric games between cleaners and clients by transferring cleaners,
Bshary (2002b) found no support for a “raising the stakes” strategy. Introduction
of a cleaner at a new locality affects its relationships with local residents and
choosy clients differently. Interactions between transferred cleaners and resi-
dents were very different from established relationships. During observations
that began two hours after transfer, cleaners refrained from cheating (median:
0/100 s interaction) and provided tactile stimulation to the dorsal area of the cli-
ents’ body during the entire interaction in about 80% of encounters. Tactile stim-
ulation is a special treat that cleaners offer to their clients, usually to make clients
that are unwilling to interact slow down for inspection or as a reconciliatory ges-
ture after a conflict due to cleaner fish cheating (Bshary and Würth 2001). Tac-
tile stimulation is incompatible with foraging and thus costly for the cleaner.
Whether tactile stimulation yields any benefits to clients is currently unknown
but clients readily accept this treat. Resident clients frequently fled from ap-
proaching transferred cleaners (median: 16% of all interactions) and often
chased cleaners without apparent reason, i.e., without the cleaners trying to ap-
proach them (median: 26% of all interactions). After 24 hr, these behaviors of
cleaners and clients were still significantly elevated compared with a control
group in which cleaners were caught and released at their original cleaning sta-
tion. (Fleeing and unprovoked aggression hardly ever occur when relationships
are established.) Thus, cleaners and residents clearly build up relationships with
transaction specific investments but opposite to the predictions of raising the
stakes. Initial heavy investment by both partners is necessary to gain eventually
the benefits of cleaning interactions between established partners. A likely ex-
planation for this pattern is that residents seem to “expect” heavy cheating by the
cleaner and show off their ability to punish first. Note that the behavior of resi-
dents toward immigrated cleaners restricts advantages that cleaners might gain
from a roving strategy and works in favor of stationary cleaners.
Interactions between experimentally transferred cleaners and choosy clients
were “normal” from the very beginning with respect to the parameters mea-
sured, i.e., duration of interactions, client jolt rate, and cleaners providing tactile
stimulation. Cleaners were typically transferred over distances of 200–400 m
coastline, which virtually excludes the possibility that the choosy clients already
knew them from their previous station. This experiment again shows that market
theory is essential to understand the strategies played by both cleaners and cli-
ents. It explains why relationships first go through a phase of investment in
trust-building behavior when clients have no option to choose another partner
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and have to rely on their ability to punish to control their partner. No such
trust-building phase is necessary when the client can switch to another cleaner.
Interaction between Partner Choice and Indirect Reciprocity
As in reciprocal altruism, an individual may help another improve his chances to
receive help. In “indirect reciprocity,” however, the altruistic act improves an in-
dividual’s chances of obtaining help in return, not only from the recipient, but
from bystanders who witnessed the altruistic act. By behaving altruistically, the
altruist gains something like an “image score” or “social prestige” (Alexander
1987; Zahavi 1995), and individuals with a high score are the most likely ones to
receive help by others or to be chosen as cooperation partners. This idea has been
modeled by Nowak and Sigmund (1998) and by Leimar and Hammerstein
(2001); Wedekind and Milinski (2000) provided experimental evidence for its
adaptive value in humans. Transferring the logic of indirect reciprocity to the
cleaner fish – client mutualism, it might pay for cleaners to refrain from cheat-
ing current clients if onlookers base their decision to invite inspection on what
they witness: “Stay if you see a cooperative cleaner, flee if you witness a cheat-
ing cleaner.” (Remember that cheating is often followed by the client darting off
or chasing the cleaner and that these behaviors probably provide an easily ob-
servable cue for bystanders as opposed to looking for client jolts.) The predic-
tion based on image scoring is opposite to what is predicted by market theory.
The market paradigm suggests that the cleaner can drop its service quality and
hence cheat more frequently when there is a temporarily high demand for clean-
ing. Clients indeed seem to base their decision to seek inspection on what they
witness: field observations revealed that if clients supposedly saw a positive in-
teraction, they almost always invited inspection (median: 100%), and if they
saw a negative interaction, they rarely invited inspection (median: 15%)
(Bshary 2002a). Thus, cleaners have an image score that depends on how coop-
eratively they behave. In turn, cleaners cheated current clients less frequently in
the presence of bystanders than in the absence of bystanders (A. D’Souza and R.
Bshary, unpubl. data). Distinguishing between resident bystanders and choosy
bystanders, the effect is significant only in the presence of choosy clients (nega-
tive correlation between current client jolt rate and number of choosy bystanders
for 15 out of 16 species), not in the presence of resident clients (negative correla-
tion between current client jolt rate and number of resident bystanders for 9 out
of 14 species). This apparent differentiation by cleaners, which should be
backed up with further data, makes sense in the light of market theory as only
image scoring choosy clients may decide to visit another cleaner instead.
There is an interesting twist to the story: choosy client species that visit a
cleaning station in large schools (Abudefduf vaigiensis, Caesio lunaris) jolt ex-
tremely frequently (about 20 jolts/100 s interactions), whereas jolt rates in inter-
actions between cleaners and single-visiting individuals of the same species are
“normal” compared to other client species (about 5 jolts/100 s interactions) (A.
13
D’Souza and R. Bshary, unpubl. data). Apossible explanation is that individuals
in schools are not moving independently of the other school members and there-
fore stay around at the station as long as the school does, even if the cleaner
cheats. School cohesion might thus offset image scoring, and in its absence, the
market effect of a temporarily high demand for cleaning service leads to low ser-
vice quality by cleaners.
CONCLUSIONS ANDOUTLOOK
We believe that market theory, with its emphasis on partner choice, provides a
useful framework to study payoff distributions and strategy sets of collaborators
in intraspecific cooperation and interspecific mutualism. In particular, market
theory generates testable predictions about exchange rates that may result in
payoff asymmetries between partners, whereas partner control models based on
the IPD do not. As partner choice occurs to some extent in most natural systems,
partner choice by the limiting class of traders can be a powerful control mecha-
nism to control defection by members of the common class of traders. There-
fore, future partner control models must have partner choice options
incorporated into their assumptions to become more realistic. Until now, the in-
corporation of partner choice within the framework of the IPD has focused on
defectors being able to rove (see references in Dugatkin 1997) and has con-
cluded that partner switching may hinder the evolution of cooperation. Other re-
cent models, however, suggest that partner choice may enhance cooperation
(Ferriere and Michod 1995).
Pure free markets will probably turn out to be very rare in nature. The form
and outcome of most cases of cooperation and mutualism will be determined by
more than partner choice and outbidding alone. The market effect is but one of
several sources of leverage cooperating individuals have over each other. Other
sources are:
• The option of simply terminating the relationship.
• The option to switch from a cooperative to an exploitative strategy, described
as “defection” in IPD models.
• The use of force to influence the outcome of current or future interactions.
This is the sort of leverage described in models of dominance, in models of
conflict, and in punishment models.
• The possibility to steal desired commodities, as in parasitic relationships.
• The possibility to influence interactions of the partner with third parties, as
described in models that take “image scoring” into consideration.
Such sources of leverage contribute to what is known as the “power” one indi-
vidual or group has over another in the economic, political, and sociological lit-
erature (Bowles and Hammerstein, this volume; Lewis 2002). Some or all of
these sources of power may influence a single mutualistic relationship simulta-
neously. To keep things traceable, we need to understand fully the interactions
with one or two sources of sole power. Ultimately, all six, and perhaps more,
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building blocks should be integrated in what can be called “power models” of
cooperation. It seems to us that the most promising way forward is to use
well-understood empirical examples to guide the building of more complex
models, in order to avoid the sterile theorizing of the recent past. Our remarks
below are intended to guide the further development of market models.
Modeling Market Theory
Earlier, we stated that market models might (a) help explain the evolution of
traits beneficial to the partner but detrimental to its bearer as well as (b) provide
quantitative predictions about exchange rates of commodities based on sup-
ply/demand ratios. Noë and Hammerstein (1994, 1995; see also Noë 2001) have
taken initial steps toward solving the first problem, but the second issue has
barely been addressed, apart from the obvious prediction that exchange rates
should shift in favor of a trader class whose commodity becomes in short supply.
The second problem has been totally ignored in cooperation theory until now.
This has partly been due to historically determined blindness, but also because it
may prove to be a more difficult issue to resolve. In sexual selection theory, this
problem has not been ignored and several models have been proposed to ex-
plain, for example, the relationship between the operational sex ratio and paren-
tal investment. The same problem exists in cooperative and mutualistic
interactions. Flowering plants, lycaenid butterfly larvae, and aphids have to de-
cide how many units of sugar they offer to pollinators or ants. Similarly, helpers
have to “decide” how much food they provide to the territory owners’ offspring,
and cleaners have to decide how often they cheat their clients.
Incomplete Control over Trading and a Shift fromMutualism to Parasitism
To explore the effects of partner choice, it is best to assume that each trading
partner has complete control over the resource or commodity it offers. In reality,
however, forceful exchange of goods or robbery may occur frequently. In partic-
ular, in situations where one partner cannot control whether an interaction takes
place or when it ends, the other partner may be more likely to cheat. Based on
cleaner fish – client data, Johnstone and Bshary (2002) developed a model with
the following properties.
1. One class of traders in a potentially mutualistic interaction has the option
to vary the degree to which it exploits its partner, assuming that exploita-
tion yields a higher payoff than cooperation.
2. The potential victim has variable degree of control over the duration of
an interaction.
It turned out that as long as the potential victim has sufficient control of the dura-
tion, interactions were mutualistic for both participants. With decreasing control
and increasing temptation to defect, the outcome of interactions became more
and more parasitic. The model yields three important implications: First,
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cooperation may be stable when only one partner has the option to cheat. Sec-
ond, despite the temptation to cheat, cooperation may evolve in one-round inter-
actions. Finally, two figurative screws, namely the temptation to cheat and the
degree of control by the potential victim, can be turned to explain interactions
shifting between mutualism and parasitism. As it stands, the model is very sim-
ple in its assumptions. Incorporating the possibility for the potential victim to
switch partners would probably make the mutualism more stable. In general, we
predict that combining the market effect with any other source of leverage may
offer a powerful approach to explain transitions from mutualism to parasitism.
Statements and Open Questions
• Partner choice should be recognized as one of several sources of leverage co-
operating organisms have over each other. Other such sources are the option
to refuse interactions, to switch from cooperation to exploitation, the use of
force, the possibility to steal commodities, and the effect on the “image score”
of the partner.
• Partner choice options, influenced by the costs of choosing and by supply and
demand are major predictors of payoff distributions among cooperators and
mutualists. Future research must take the step from qualitative predictions in
payoff shifts to quantitative predictions of “exchange rates.”
• Participants in cooperation and mutualism typically have different options,
which means that asymmetric games are the appropriate paradigms. Al-
though these asymmetries do not affect market theory, it is clear that IPD
models are useless to explain or predict the evolution or the strategies played
in these systems. To understand the evolution of cooperation between unre-
lated individuals, we need asymmetric strategy sets.
• As it stands, the emphasis of future research should be on collecting quantita-
tive data that allow the development of deductive models as a basis for new
empirical research. A lack of empirical studies that confirm the predictions of
available partner control models, most of which were developed uncon-
strained by facts, may reflect the lack of realism of these models.
• Restricted market games in which individuals may have incomplete control,
either over the recourse they trade or over the course of interactions, are most
likely to yield a framework that may help to understand under which circum-
stances symbioses may be commensalistic or parasitic rather than
mutualistic.
• Cooperation and defection are often seen as a hallmark of Machiavellian in-
telligence, the idea that primates have their large neocortex to cope with a
complex social environment (Byrne and Whiten 1988). Nowak and Sigmund
(1998) proposed that indirect reciprocity based on image scoring may have
been crucial for the evolution of human societies. As it stands, these phenom-
ena may well occur in a wide variety of taxa. We therefore wonder how cogni-
tive abilities or constraints influence game structures and how one could
potentially distinguish “complex” cooperation from “brainless” cooperation.
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